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The adverse shock affecting commodity prices has received
little attention, at least by comparison with the recent
financial crisis. The latest fall in international prices shows
that, contrary to what is claimed in the empirical literature,
most of these prices tend to move in unison during periods
of expansion and contraction in the economic cycle. Constant
shocks help account for the variability of Bolivian export
prices, and the inclusion of a new sector, soya, in the export
portfolio has not reduced overall risk. The conclusion is that
Bolivia’s policy of diversifying commodity exports has not
had the effect of reducing risk, evening out cycles, reducing
price volatility or increasing real export revenue. It is
suggested that manufacturing exports be developed to make
the country less vulnerable to shocks.
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Because prices moved in the same direction, portfolio
risk increased.
Situations like those described have major policy
implications, since if risk is rising rather than falling, if
periods of declining prices coincide and shocks are
persistent, it would be wrong to rely solely on an
implicit policy of commodity export diversification.
Rather, structural measures would be needed to raise
the share of manufacturing exports.
The recent literature on commodity price
fluctuations is small compared to the literature on
financial crises. There is Dehn’s study (2000a) of the
effects of commodity price uncertainty and shocks on
growth, and the work of Cashin and Patillo (2000) on
terms of trade shocks in Africa. Cashin, Liang and
McDermott (1999) have analysed the persistence of
commodity price shocks, and Cashin, McDermott and
Scott (1999b) have examined the myth of comovement
in these prices. The main reference work, however, is
still Reinhart and Wickham’s study (1994) on the
persistence or otherwise of commodity price shocks.
Against this background, the main goal of this
paper is to ascertain whether the diversification of
commodity exports during the crisis years of 1998 and
1999 acted as a kind of countercyclical policy that offset
the negative effects of large falls in international prices,
or whether, conversely, it neither lowered the portfolio
risk of the export basket nor reduced the country’s
external vulnerability.
The specific objective is to analyse the behaviour
of Bolivia’s export commodity prices during the recent
crisis, in order to ascertain in broad terms whether
shocks are persistent or transitory, whether there are
comovements in cyclical price behaviour, how volatile
prices are and what degree of risk attaches to the export
commodity basket.
The period of analysis, based on monthly series,
runs from January 1992 to September 2000.
Information on the commodity basket in this period
has been produced by the Central Bank of Bolivia using
December 1996 as the baseline. This provides a
reference framework for analysing the external price
shock in 1998 and 1999.
To this end, section II of this article reviews the
theoretical and empirical literature on commodity price
The recent international crisis and international
financial shocks have focused debate on capital flows,
the great volatility of these, and the contagion effect.
The sharp fall in international commodity prices has
not received as much attention, however. Indeed, the
commodity price shock, with all the harm it has entailed
for developing economies that depend on commodity
exports, was one of the severest and most virulent
shocks in many years, yet it appears to have gone
unnoticed.
Because Bolivia is not an active participant in the
international bond and share market –i.e., direct
portfolio investment is not high and short-term capital
mobility is low1– and because it is heavily dependent
on commodity exports, international commodity price
shocks need to be analysed with great care. There has
been such a shock in recent years, and this has resulted
in great instability and lower export revenues and real
incomes in Bolivia. It has to be asked whether the price
falls seen are temporary reverses that will tend to correct
themselves or can be coped with by using export
revenue stabilization measures, or whether, conversely,
they are persistent and structural in nature, and require
further-reaching measures.
Despite the shift in its economic policy since
August 1985, Bolivia has not been able to increase
manufacturing exports as a proportion of total exports.
It has succeeded in diversifying its commodity exports,
however, unlike 57 developing countries in Africa and
Latin America that rely on three commodities for over
50% of their exports. According to portfolio theory,
this situation should mean lower risk as long as the
prices of the commodities in the export basket do not
behave in the same way, i.e., as long as there are negative
covariances. In the recent crisis, the prices of most of
the commodities in the Bolivian export basket fell.
This paper is part of a wider study being conducted by the author
at the Central Bank of Bolivia. The opinions expressed herein are
not necessarily those of the Bank. The author is grateful to Boris
Zambrano for drafting the econometric part of the paper under the
supervision of Oscar Lora, and to Raúl Mendoza, Oscar Lora and
Boris Gamarra for their comments and suggestions.
1 The economy has become more internationalized in recent years
with the appearance of foreign banks in the country’s financial
system.
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behaviour, laying stress on Prebisch’s theory (1962,
originally published in Spanish in 1949) of commodity
price volatility and long-term deterioration in the terms
of trade. Section III then analyses the trend and
composition of Bolivian exports in the 1990s, the
commodity price indices that are available and the
behaviour of the terms of trade. Sections IV and V set
out the empirical evidence for determining whether
external shocks are persistent or temporary, how volatile
commodity prices are, and what level of portfolio risk
attaches to the export commodities basket. Section VI,
lastly, sets forth some conclusions and offers some
policy recommendations concerning the need to
develop manufacturing exports.
II
Commodity prices: some theoretical and
empirical considerations
The subject of declining commodity prices was
introduced into the economic literature by the theories
of Prebisch (1962, originally published in Spanish in
1949) and Singer (1950), who stated that, in the long
term, there was a permanent tendency for the terms of
trade to decline, as commodity prices rose by less than
those of manufactures (ECLAC, 1969).
There were originally two versions of the theory.
According to Bielschowsky (1998), the first, expounded
in the so-called “Latin American manifesto” (Prebisch,
1962, originally published in Spanish in 1949), stated
that in the down phase of the cycle, unions in the
industrialized countries managed to prevent the prices
of industrial goods from falling, thereby more than
offsetting the gains accruing to the periphery from
cyclical upturns in commodity prices. The second
version, expounded by Prebisch (1952) and
subsequently developed by Lewis (1960), alluded to
an excess of agricultural labour in the periphery that
could not be transferred to the developed countries, and
that therefore depressed the prices of that sector’s
output. Ultimately, as Ros (1998) shows, both versions
centre on the relative rigidity of labour markets in
developed and developing countries.
A third, more elegant version, based on Singer
(1950), focused on differences in the price elasticity of
demand and income elasticity for commodities, which
were less than one. The expanded version given in
ECLAC (1969), however, suggests that if prices strictly
reflected the cost reductions yielded by technical
progress, industrial prices would fall by more than
commodity prices, because productivity rises by more
in industry than in primary activities. Since technical
progress is distributed unevenly among countries, the
periphery tends to transfer some of the benefits of its
technical progress to the central countries, while the
latter retain the benefits of theirs.
Pure international trade theory saw deteriorating
terms of trade as an esoteric technical problem, while
in the political sphere it was a very emotionally charged
issue. Besides the long-term decline of commodity
prices, there was the subject of export price instability,
although Krueger (1984) maintains that strictly these
are two separate issues. The empirical literature
downgraded the proposition to the level of a
hypothesis,2 considering that the evidence was not
conclusive. The empirical basis taken by Prebisch
covered the period from 1870 to 1930 and used British
export prices as a proxy for manufactured goods prices
and British import prices as a proxy for commodity
prices. In a 1980 study, Spraos concluded that there
probably was a long-term decline in the period looked
at by Prebisch, but that it was very questionable whether
the same had occurred since the post-war period. Even
Michaely stated in 1982 that poor countries’ export
prices rose more quickly in the 1952-1973 period than
those of rich countries.
Sprout (1992) notes that efforts to prove the theory
have produced discouragingly inconsistent results and
concludes, using a quantitative criterion, that a third of
the most important studies bear out Prebisch’s
hypothesis while a quarter refute it.
The subject of price instability has also been seen
as quite contradictory and inconclusive, and the view
2 Concerning this point and the references to Spraos and Michaely
further on in the paragraph, see Borensztein, Khan and others
(1994).
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taken has been that even in the short term this instability
has been exaggerated (Krueger, 1984, p. 595).
The policies recommended by IMF for coping with
balance-of-payments disequilibria caused by declining
export revenues basically come down to two:
compensatory emergency financing, established in
1964, and price stabilization funds for specific products.
These measures were based on the assumption that
imbalances were temporary.
In the mid-1990s, stress was again placed on the
persistence of commodity price shocks by the empirical
work of Reinhart and Wickham (1994), who found the
following patterns for the period 1957-1993 by breaking
down time series between long-term and cyclical
tendencies:
— The weakness of real commodity prices is long-
term and persistent, and is not due to temporary
deviations from the trend.
— The relative importance of permanent price shocks
varies depending on the product group taken, being
lowest for metals and highest for beverages (coffee,
tea).
— The characteristics of the cycle vary by product,
being less persistent for metals and more persistent
for beverages.
— Average prices are strikingly low and a steady
increase is seen in the variance of commodity
prices. The coefficient of variation rises sharply
and prices become more volatile around the mean.
The recommendations of the study cited
emphasized the need to adopt structural policies like
export diversification, given that price weakness was
long-term. Because prices were so volatile, however,
they also considered it advisable to use coverage
strategies and stabilization funds.
Only in the late 1990s, however, did the empirical
literature show a renewed interest in commodities.
Cashin, Liang and McDermott (1999) relied on
estimation of the unbiased median, which is better than
the unit root test for determining the persistence of
commodity price shocks, and used monthly information
on 60 commodities for the period 1957-1998. Their
study found that, for most commodities, price shocks
were typically long-lasting and that their persistence
was quite variable. It also found differences among
groups of products, persistence being greater for metals
than for woods. Consequently, it concluded that it was
wrong to see commodity price shocks as a temporary
phenomenon: when they are persistent, an adverse
shock is likely to depress prices for a long time. It
follows from this that measures such as compensatory
financing and stabilization funds are probably not
effective and that consumption smoothing is
unsustainable.
In their analysis of the duration and scale of
commodity price cycles, based on monthly series for
36 products, Cashin, McDermott and Scott (1999a) find
the following for 1957-1999:
— Price cycles are asymmetrical, with the down stage
lasting at least a year longer than the up stage.
— Prices fall by more in the down phase of the cycle
than they rise in the recovery phase, while they
move faster in the up stage than in the down stage.
— There is little evidence that the price cycle takes a
consistent form.
— There is no relationship of dependence between
the duration of the down phase and the duration of
the up phase. If large adverse price movements
continue for a long time, this does not make it more
likely that the down phase will end with the
beginning of the recovery phase.
A recent study by Cashin, McDermott and Scott
(1999b), using monthly information for the period
1957-1999, finds empirical evidence that commodity
prices do not move in unison, except where the products
are directly related (in the same sector or branch).
Defining comovement as concordance, i.e., the
proportion of time spent by the prices of two
commodities in the same upward or downward phase,
it does not find any evidence that these prices move
together, except for gold and petroleum. The policy
conclusions that can be drawn are important, since if
commodity prices moved together, risk could only be
reduced by diversifying into manufactured exports, for
which the country concerned might have no
comparative advantages. Conversely, if there are no
comovements then commodity exports themselves can
be diversified.
After many years, the subject of terms of trade
shocks has been reinvigorated. Cashin and Patillo
(2000) note that this is one of the most important relative
prices and that economists are ignorant of many of its
empirical properties. In their study of 42 countries in
sub-Saharan Africa in the period 1990-1996, they find
that in half of them shocks are short-lived, lasting less
than four years, whereas in a third shocks are
permanent. Discussing the policy implications, they say
that if shocks are short-lived then there is scope for
smoothing the path of national consumption by
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modifying patterns of national saving and international
financing. But if shocks are long-lasting,
countercyclical policies will be of little help in
establishing a new equilibrium.
The effects of shocks on economic growth has been
dealt with in Dehn (2000b); dependence on commodity
exports means that adverse shocks have not just an ex
post effect but also an ex ante one of uncertainty, a
combination which reduces growth prospects. Positive
shocks, by contrast, are rapidly diluted and do not have
any major long-term effects.
To sum up, the recent empirical and theoretical
literature has not attached the same importance to
commodity price shocks as to financial crises. Empirical
evidence has now been found to show that these shocks
are persistent and that the downward phase of price
movements lasts longer than the upward phase. In other
words, certain facts seem to bear out the idea that there
is a long-term trend towards lower prices. There is also
empirical evidence, however, which goes against the
perception that commodity prices move together, and
this seems to rule out price falls across the board.
III
The trend and composition of
Bolivian exports
This part of the paper will briefly analyse the trend and
composition of Bolivian exports, and will present the
price index for the country’s commodity export basket
and the monthly terms of trade index for commodities
against manufactures.
Over a longer period, the latter index shows that
the terms of trade for the Bolivian economy have been
deteriorating steadily and persistently since 1980.
Prices fell twice in the 1980s, first in 1981 and 1982,
when they dropped by 8.3% and 11.2%, respectively,
and then between 1985 and 1987, when they declined
by about 12% a year. In both cases, lower prices for
minerals, particularly tin, were the main cause.
Subsequently, in the 1990s, there were two major
terms of trade shocks. The first one lasted four years,
beginning in 1992 when the terms of trade fell by 16%,
partly because of lower gas prices following changes
to the contract under which gas was exported to
Argentina. The second one, which was briefer,
occurred in 1998, and was associated with the Asian
crisis and the international financial crisis. This time
the decline was 5%.
The terms of trade (figure 1) have fluctuated, with
long periods of decline and very few years of recovery
between 1980 and 2000.
1. Bolivian exports in the 1990s
Between 1990 and 1999, Bolivia’s nominal export
revenues averaged US$ 1,018.7 million dollars a year
(15% of GDP). These revenues were quite volatile, with
a standard deviation of US$ 176.8 million, equivalent
to 17% of the average.
The nominal value of exports grew by 1.1% a year
over the decade, a very low rate when compared, for
instance, with the figures for the whole world (5.5%),
South America (4.9%) and Chile (7.2%). In real terms,
exports fell by 5.7% over 10 years, with two periods of
decline: between 1990 and 1992, when they fell by 27%
TTI ’80 = 100 Var. TT
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the National
Institute of Statistics (INE).
a TTI: terms of trade index. Var. TT: percentage variation in TTI.
FIGURE 1
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owing to a drop in gas exports to Argentina, and in
1998 and 1999, when the international crisis resulted
in a cumulative fall of 16%. In the 1990s, then, the
Bolivian economy experienced two external shocks
resulting in large falls in real export revenue (table 1).
The poor performance of Bolivian exports contrasts
with the dynamism of world trade. Whereas Bolivian
exports increased by just 10% in nominal terms over
10 years, world exports increased by 60%.
The composition of Bolivian exports in the 1990s
continued to be dominated by commodities, although
their share of the export total fell slightly from 86.6%
in 1990 to 84% in 1999. The share of manufactured
exports, meanwhile, increased by less than one
percentage point in 10 years, from 13.2% to 14%.
Structurally, Bolivian exports are highly
asymmetrical compared to world exports. According
to WTO (2000), manufactures make up over three
quarters of world exports, but less than a sixth of
Bolivian exports. This share is lower than that of the
African countries (30%), and far below the Latin
American average (60%). Consequently, the slow
increase in Bolivian exports is basically due to the
sluggish growth of its commodity exports.
Manufacturing exports rose by more than 3.5% a year
over the decade, but are only a small part of the total.
The various primary exports behaved very
differently over the decade. Bolivia’s agricultural
exports grew by 10.3% a year, which is well above the
world average of 3.1%, while hydrocarbon exports fell
by 11% a year owing, as already mentioned, to the
ending of the contract to export gas to Argentina. The
country’s mining exports were stagnant over 10 years,
while exports of this type grew by 1.5% a year
worldwide.
This lack of export dynamism was due to falling
unit export prices, since while the value index rose by
10%, the volume index rose by 57%, implying a
contraction of 30% in the export unit value index. This
drop was greater than the decline in world unit prices
for mining (22%) and agriculture (8%), and greater too
than the fall in the commodity price index (13%). Part
of the explanation lies in the drastic two-thirds reduction
in the gas price set in the contract with Argentina, which
took place between the first quarter of 1991 and the
second quarter of 1992.
Not only did Bolivian export prices decline, but
unit import prices rose by 17.1%, resulting in a sharp
deterioration (40%) in the terms of trade. Excluding
the initial effect of the fall in the gas price in the early
1990s, the deterioration was 22%. The effect of the
terms of trade on export revenue, as estimated by INE,
was such that if export prices had behaved in the same
way as import prices in 1999, the country would have
had US$ 597 million more revenue. The deterioration
of the terms of trade means that Bolivia is transferring
part of its domestic production effort abroad and losing
revenue in real terms. What happened in the country in
the 1990s is an empirical demonstration of this.
In summary, the poor performance of Bolivian
exports stands in contrast to the dynamism of world
exports, most of which are manufactures, owing to the
country’s dependence on commodities whose prices
experienced two severe external shocks in the 1990s,
with adverse effects for real export revenues.
2. The price index for the Bolivian export
commodity basket
The structure of Bolivian exports is heavily skewed
towards commodities, which account for 84% of the
total. A wide range of commodities is involved, and
exports are not dominated by just a handful of products
as is usually the case in developing countries. They are
drawn from different sectors of the economy, having
ceased to depend on any particular one.
The Central Bank of Bolivia uses several indices
to measure prices and price variations for commodities
TABLE 1
Bolivian export values, nominal
and real termsa
(Millions of dollars)
Year Nominal Import price Real
value index value
1990 937.5 100.0 937.5
1991 873.8 105.5 828.2
1992 742.1 108.5 684.0
1993 786.7 110.7 710.7
1994 1,091.0 114.1 956.2
1995 1,139.1 118.2 963.7
1996 1,216.2 121.1 1,004.3
1997 1,255.6 120.0 1,046.3
1998 1,110.1 118.4 937.6
1999 1,034.8 117.1 883.7
GGR 1.1 1.8 -0.7
% var. 99/90 10.4 17.1 -5.7
Mean 1,018.7 113.4 895.2
SD 176.8 7.0 120.2
CV 0.17 0.06 0.13
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the National
Institute of Statistics (INE).
a GGR: geometric growth rate. SD: standard deviation.
CV: coefficient of variation.
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in the export basket. The basket consists of 13
commodities, or 11 if hydrocarbons are excluded
(table 2).
This basket has the following characteristics:
— For each product on which daily information is
available, the price is multiplied by its weighting
in the basket as determined by its share of export
value in 1996. The Laspeyres index is therefore
used, i.e.:
ΣPn Qo
LPI = ΣPo Qo
— Commodities accounted for 80.5% of the value
exported in 1996, falling to 68.8% if hydrocarbons
are excluded. The index is calculated with and
without fuels (IMF also does this) to separate out
the effects of large oil price swings.
— The information is available in real time through
the Reuters service, except in the case of woods,
for which the information source is the Vice-
Ministry of Exports, and of natural gas, information
on which is provided by Yacimientos Petrolíferos
Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), which releases price
information a month in arrears.
— The baseline is the December 1996 price. This is
consistent with the base year for calculating the
effective real exchange rate.
The 13 products in the basket were grouped into three
sectors so that sectoral behaviour could be differentiated:
the mining sector, which includes four products; the
agricultural sector, which includes seven products; and
the hydrocarbons sector, which covers gas and petroleum.
Since gas and petroleum do not behave alike, however,
because of the gas export contract with Argentina, they
are considered separately for practical reasons. In the case
of agricultural products, a subgroup, the soya complex,
was created. This includes soya beans, soya meal and soya
oil. Each product kept its weighting, so the weighting of
the sector in the total is the sum of each of its products.
In summary, the following indicators are available:
— Price indices for each product: 13 in all.
— Overall price index (OPI).
— Overall price index without fuel (OPI w/f).
— Mining price index (MPI).
— Agricultural price index (API).
— Price index for the soya complex.
TABLE 2
Bolivia: Export commodity basket, 1996a






Soya beans US/MT 5.3
Soya meal US/MT 9.0










Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Central
Bank of Bolivia.
a US: dollars. CUS: cents. LB: pound. FLB: fine pound. MT: metric
tons. TCF: thousands of cubic feet. FTO: fine troy ounce.
IV
The commodity price trend, shocks
and comovements
This part of the paper will use empirical indicators to
analyse the trend of commodity prices, short-term
shocks that have affected them and their recent decline,
to determine whether their behaviour is temporary and
the shock will tend to subside, or whether there is a
permanent or structural component. It will also try to
judge whether the prices of commodities in the export
basket are moving in unison, i.e., whether their rising
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and falling periods coincide, or whether they behave
countercyclically so that an upward movement in one
commodity is offset by a downward movement in
another.
1. The trend of commodity prices
To analyse the behaviour of commodity prices in the
1990s, using the overall and ex-fuel indices, price time
series were broken down into two components: long-
term trend and short-term shock.
From January 1992 onward, commodity prices
moved in short bursts (lasting about eight months)
of contraction and recovery, but in April 1994 the
index began a 25-month period of increase, the
longest in the decade, peaking in April 1996 at 107.4
(figure 2). Then the short cycle (six months) of
contraction and recovery returned, until in June
1997, with the Asian crisis, the longest downward
cycle of the 1990s began (25 months). This ended
in July 1999 when the price index bottomed out at
81.5. Only in August 1999 did prices begin to
recover steadily, and this lasted until May 2000,
after which they climbed more erratically until
September the same year. For petroleum the
recovery phase began earlier, in March 1999, when
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) decided to cut output.
The longest period of rising prices (25 months)
had the same duration as the longest period of falling
prices. The drop in prices during the downward phase
(13.8% in the overall index and 15.2% in the ex-fuel
index) was larger than the increase during the upward
phase (10.8% in the overall index and 11.7% in the ex-
fuel index). The overall index stood at 81.6 at the
beginning of the recovery phase in 1999, which is below
the 88.6 value at which recovery began in 1993.
The long-term trend, obtained using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter smoothing method (Hodrick and Prescott,
1997), has the wave pattern which is a key characteristic
of commodity prices3 (figure 2).
The Hodrick-Prescott filter is a two-sided linear
filter that computes a smoothed series s of y, minimizing
the variance of y around s, while subjecting it to a
penalty that constrains the second difference of s. This
means that the Hodrick-Prescott filter chooses st to
minimize the following objective function:
T T–1
Σ(yt –st)2 + λ Σ {(st+1–st)–(st–st–1)}2
t=1 t=2
The penalty parameter λ controls the smoothness of
the st series. The larger λ is, the smoother the series. If
λ → ∝, st approximates to a linear trend. In this paper,
λ = 14,400, following Hodrick and Prescott’s
suggestion for monthly series.
Smoothing the trend in the 1990s, we end up with
a wave pattern that begins with an 18-month-long
contractionary phase, lasting until August 1993. This
is followed by a long recovery phase, lasting 36 months,
3 See Cashin, McDermott and Scott (1999a).
FIGURE 2
Commodity price index: trend and short-term shock
Trend Short-term shock
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Bolivia.
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that ends in August 1996, then by a 49 month
contractionary phase and the onset of a recovery phase
in mid-1999 and the first three quarters of 2000.
The series showing the short-term price shocks is
obtained residually as the difference between the long-
term trend series and the original series. It shows that
prices are below trend in a falling market and above
trend in a rising market. Between 1992 and 1996 they
fluctuate greatly, but from December 1996 until April
1998 there is a sustained, 17-month recovery during
which prices are above trend. Between May 1998 and
September 1999, however, prices are well below trend,
suggesting that the adverse effect of the price shock
was felt most in this period, although the decline had
begun earlier, in June 1997. Prices thus fell to a level
nine points below the index trend value, as happened
in April and July 1999.
2. Persistent or temporary shock?
To determine how important a role is played by
persistent shocks, a two-stage procedure was followed.
Firstly, the properties of the time series were established
using the Dickey-Fuller and augmented Dickey-Fuller
tests for unit roots. Table 3 gives the critical values for
the level and first-difference tests. If y is stationary, the
shocks are transitory; if y is an order one integrated process,
on the other hand, then there is a permanent component.
In the second stage, the size of the permanent
component was determined using Cochrane’s
methodology, which measures the persistence of shocks
by examining the variance of their differences. This
has the following form:
1 var(yt –yt–k)
PS = (—) * —————k var(yt –yt–1)
On the basis of the persistence statistic (PS), if the
ratio equals 1, the variable y follows a random walk
and all the shocks are permanent. If y is stationary, all
the shocks subside so that the ratio tends to zero,
indicating that the shocks will be temporary. If y is an
integrated order one process, it has transitory and
permanent components, so that the ratio will converge
on the ratio between the variance of the permanent
shock and the total variance of variable y. Thus, the
closer the ratio is to one, the larger the permanent
component and the less the relative importance of
temporary shocks. This measurement was applied for
k = 1, 12 and 24 lags as the data are monthly (table 4).
In the case of Bolivia, the price series with and
without fuels and by sector (metals, agriculture, soya
complex and fuels) are integrated and follow an order
one process. It was found that in each price series
(overall and sectoral), permanent shocks played a role
in explaining the variance of monthly prices.
The effect of the permanent component of shocks
is greater for metal prices (accounting for 69% of
TABLE 3
Unit root analysis:a Dickey-Fuller test and augmented Dickey-Fuller test
Series Levels Critical values First differences Order of Critical values
No. lags Model t-Statistic 1% 5% No. lags Model t-Statistic integrationb 1% 5%
OPI 4 C -1.416578 -4.055 -3.4561 4 B -5.217714 1(1) -3.4993 -2.8915
OPIWF 4 C -1.343285 -4.0521 -3.4548 4 A -4.471892 1(1) -2.5866 -1.9433
Agriculture 4 C -1.511792 -4.0521 -3.4548 5 A -4.587867 1(1) -2.5868 -1.9434
Soya complex 4 C -1.5352 -4.0521 -3.4548 0 A -13.7045 1(1) -2.5858 -1.9432
Metals 2 C -3.0101 -4.0503 -3.4539 2 C -5.35682 1(1) -3.4972 -2.8906
Fuels 6 C -1.616115 -4.054 -3.4557 8 A -3.1834 1(1) -2.5883 -1.9436
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Bolivia.
a A: Does not include deterministic components. B: Includes constant but not trend. C: Includes constant and trend.
b When the first-differenced t-statistic is above the critical values, the series are integrated series of order one.
TABLE 4





Commodities 1 0.34 0.26
Ex-fuel commodities 1 0.38 0.38
Agricultural 1 0.28 0.24
Metals 1 0.69 0.35
Soya complex 1 0.41 0.40
Fuels 1 0.26 0.21
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Central
Bank of Bolivia.
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monthly variance) than for the agricultural and fuel
sectors, where the figure is 25%, or the overall indices
(with and without fuels), where it is about 33%. In the
metals price series this component displays a low level
of persistence, falling from 69% to 35% at 24 months.
In the other sectors and the overall index, the permanent
component does not fall off in this way. Price
stabilization policies, like the ones recommended by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), can be used to
deal with transitory shocks.
The presence of permanent shocks, however,
indicates that the commodity price weakness seen since
1997 is not just a transitory phenomenon, the effect of
an abnormal cycle associated with the Asian crisis (even
if the downward phase did begin with this crisis).
Consequently the decline did not automatically reverse
itself, nor have prices rebounded since the Asian
economies recovered in 1999. Likewise, the fall in
prices was not associated with cyclical fluctuations in
the world economy, as it occurred when the United
States economy was in the midst of a high growth period
and when the world economy was also growing. Except
in the case of petroleum, prices have recovered more
slowly than expected, and they have yet to return to the
levels seen before the upturn began.
To sum up, in Bolivia commodity price shocks have
a permanent component, although it is smaller than the
developing country average.4 The sector in which this
component is largest is metals, although it is not very
persistent there. As a result, the recent price shock has
not tended to abate rapidly.
3. Concordance or comovement in the phases of
price cycles
The cyclical behaviour of prices raises the question of
whether sectoral and product price series move together
in the upward and downward phases of the cycle.
Concordance is a measure of comovement that can be
used to compare the cyclical patterns of price series.
The statistical evidence is used to establish the
proportion of time for which the prices of two
commodities are concurrently in the same phase of the
cycle.5
For this purpose, a dichotomous variable is
specified for each original variable or price series,
taking the value unity when the variable is in the upward
phase and zero when it is in the downward phase. The




–1 {Σ (Si,tSj,t) + (1–Si,t)(1–Sj,t)}t=1
where Cij is the concordance statistic measuring the
proportion of time for which two price series are in the
same state, T is the sample size, Si,t is the dichotomous
variable associated with the original variable xi at time
t, and Sj,t is the dichotomous variable associated with
original variable xj at time t.
When the concordance statistic takes values close
to unity, the price series being compared are procyclical;
when the statistic is close to zero, the price series are
countercyclical, and when the concordance takes values
close to 0.5, the series are equally likely to be
procyclical or countercyclical. For practical purposes,
in this study an arbitrary range of +/- 0.1 is taken6 purely
to differentiate cases close to 0.5, so that a ratio of over
0.6 would indicate that the series tended to be
procyclical and one of under 0.4 that they tended to be
countercyclical.
The results for the period January 1992 to
September 2000 show (table 5) that the series for the
ex-fuel price index displays a high degree of
concordance (0.71) with the fuel price series. In other
words, they are procyclical variables. Consequently,
being a fuel exporter does not insulate a country from
the general commodity cycle. Similarly, if fuels are
excluded the behaviour of other export commodities is
procyclical. This can be seen most clearly at the sectoral
level, agricultural commodity prices being more
procyclical with fuel prices (0.81) than are metal prices
(0.60).
In the 1990s, Bolivia made progress with
agricultural exports, particularly those of the soya
complex. It was supposed that this diversification would
reduce the country’s dependence on the mining sector.
But the sectoral concordance indicators make it difficult
to say whether or not metal prices are procyclical in
relation to the prices of agricultural commodities (0.45)
or the soya complex (0.48), since the concordance
indicators are very close to 0.5.
The next step, however, is to carry out a product-
by-product analysis to identify any comovements
4 See Cashin, Liang and McDermott (1999).
5 For a more detailed explanation of concordance, see Cashin,
McDermott and Scott (1999b).
6 More detailed analysis would be needed to demonstrate what
range might be appropriate for differentiating cases close to 0.5.
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between commodity prices in the mining sector and
the agricultural sector (table 6). Out of 28 possible
combinations between pairs of agricultural and mining
products in the export basket, there seem to be nine
pairs of commodities (32%) whose price series move
together in the phases of the cycle, i.e., these
commodities are procyclical. The most procyclical are
gold, silver, cotton and soya oil. Fewer pairs (six) are
countercyclical, the clearest price relationships being
between tin and soya (0.33) and silver and soya (0.22).
As regards fuels, it seems that the prices of mining
commodities, except silver, and of agricultural
commodities, except soya oil, are procyclical with
respect to gas prices. This indicator is significant, since
for the decade beginning in 2000 hopes have been
centred on exports of gas, in relation to which very few
products are countercyclical. As regards petroleum
prices, countercyclical products seem to include mining
commodities, other than silver, and agricultural
commodities, other than woods and sugar.
To sum up, in Bolivia, by contrast with what
Cashin, McDermott and Scott (1999b) found for
developing countries generally, there is a high degree
of concordance at the sectoral level, suggesting that
commodity export diversification has not offset the
effects of the price cycle, i.e., diversification has not
been countercyclical. At the product level, however, a
third of exports are found to be countercyclical. The
prices of silver and tin (13.1% of exports in 1996) seem
to be countercyclical in relation to soya beans and soya
meal (14.3% of exports in 1996), and those of silver
seem to be countercyclical in relation to gas (8%).
TABLE 5
Bolivia: Concordance among sectors
Metals Soya Agricultural Fuels Overall price Ex-fuel
complex sector index (OPI) OPI
Metals 1.000
Soya complex 0.476 1.000
Agricultural sector 0.448 0.724 1.000
Fuels 0.600 0.533 0.810 1.000
OPI 0.505 0.705 0.943 0.752 1.000
Ex-fuel OPI 0.771 0.381 0.657 0.714 0.676 1.000
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Bolivia.
TABLE 6
Bolivia: Concordance between agricultural
commodity and metal prices
Mining Agriculture Concordance
Procyclical commodities




Gold Soya oil 0.70
Zinc Cotton 0.61
Tin Soya oil 0.70





Tin Soya beans 0.33
Tin Soya meal 0.37
Silver Soya beans 0.22
Silver Soya meal 0.18
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Central
Bank of Bolivia.
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V
Export price volatility and portfolio risk
This part of the article supplements the examination of
export commodity price behaviour with an analysis of
price volatility using the coefficient of variation, which
relates the standard deviation to the average,7 and with
calculations of portfolio risk for products in the export
basket.
1. Export price volatility
It is generally accepted that high volatility is an
important characteristic of commodity price behaviour.
In the case of Bolivia, both the overall price index and
the ex-fuel index have a volatility of 0.06 (table 7). In
the overall index volatility is lower than the 0.135
calculated by Cashin, Liang and McDermott (1999) for
a basket of 56 commodities in the period 1957-1998,
while it is somewhat higher than the 0.04 calculated
for the ex-fuel basket.
At the sectoral level, metal prices (0.05) are the
least volatile and fuel prices (0.22) are the most volatile,
with agricultural commodity prices somewhere in
between (0.11). To turn to specific commodities, prices
for soya meal (0.21) and soya oil (0.25) are highly
volatile, on a par with fuels, while coffee, sugar and
cotton prices are among the most volatile in the Bolivian
export basket.
Changes in volatility are calculated here for the
period from January 1992 to September 2000, and are
measured using cumulative values for annual average
coefficients of variation (figure 3). In the case of the
overall price index including fuels it is found to have
remained fairly steady, with a rise in volatility since
1997, while volatility in the ex-fuel index has been
TABLE 7
Bolivia: Statistics describing commodity price indices,
January 1990 to September 2000
Mean Standard Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
deviation of variation of asymmetry of kurtosis
Zinc 105.52 12.52 0.12 0.68 3.56
Gold 88.97 9.61 0.11 -0.22 1.69
Tin 94.09 7.59 0.08 -0.11 3.66
Silver 97.72 14.57 0.15 -0.07 3.18
Metals index 97.33 5.05 0.05 0.02 3.02
Soya beans 93.65 14.23 0.15 1.36 5.52
Soya meal 83.10 17.27 0.21 0.66 2.82
Soya oil 104.93 27.41 0.26 2.62 18.57
Soya complex 90.73 14.29 0.16 0.29 3.06
Wood 94.13 18.36 0.20 -0.08 3.12
Cotton 91.27 29.79 0.33 2.12 11.77
Coffee 90.66 36.05 0.40 0.71 4.63
Sugar 100.10 33.29 0.33 2.15 14.98
Agricultural index 92.14 10.49 0.11 0.26 2.42
Gas 97.10 25.15 0.26 2.57 12.25
Petroleum 77.11 18.26 0.24 1.02 4.92
Fuel index 86.16 19.32 0.22 1.72 7.79
Ex-fuel index 94.76 6.08 0.06 0.25 2.39
Overall price index (OPI) 95.18 5.95 0.06 -0.30 2.45
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Bolivia.
7 As fractions of one. The coefficient of variation is usually
expressed as a percentage (Moya, 1991).
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increasing. At the sectoral level, the volatility of metal
prices was fairly constant over the period, while both
agricultural and petroleum commodities became more
volatile. The international crisis led to greater volatility
in all export sectors; this increase was neither
simultaneous nor constant, however. For metals,
volatility rose in 1997 but then fell, while for
agricultural commodities it rose in the early stages of
the crisis in 1997, fell in 1998 and then rose again in
1999. Fuel prices were more volatile in 1998 and 2000.
The end result was that the ex-fuel index was more
volatile in 1997 and 1999, while the overall index was
more volatile in 1999 only.
For illustrative purposes, and to complete the
description of the frequency distributions, the other
statistics relating to the directions of price series data
dispersion around their centre will be given. The
characteristics concerned are asymmetry and kurtosis
FIGURE 3
Bolivia: Volatility of export commodity prices
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or pointedness. The frequency distribution of the overall
price index has a negative asymmetry (the mode, the
value that occurs most frequently, is higher than the
mean), i.e., the distribution has a longer tail to the left,
or towards small values of the variable, while the ex-
fuel index has a positive asymmetry (the mode is lower
than the mean), i.e., the distribution has a longer tail to
the right. Most mining sector commodity prices have a
negative asymmetry. The frequency distribution of
commodity prices as measured using the overall index
and the ex-fuel index presents a flatter (leptokurtic)
distribution. However, the main mining commodities,
those of the soya complex and fuels present a more
pointed or platykurtic frequency distribution than
normal, indicating that the values cluster more closely
around the average.
To sum up, Bolivia’s overall price index does not
display high volatility when compared with prices in
developing countries generally (see, for example,
Reinhart and Wickham, 1994). Metal prices are the least
volatile and fuel prices the most volatile. While the
volatility of agricultural prices is intermediate, soya
meal, soya oil, coffee, sugar and cotton are the most
volatile commodities in the Bolivian export basket. The
international crisis increased price volatility in 1997
and again in 1999.
2. Commodity export portfolio risk
To ascertain whether the country’s implicit strategy of
diversifying commodity exports reduced export
portfolio risk, the first step was to calculate the matrices
of variances and covariances among the product and
sectoral price indices, after which portfolio risk was
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 = value of sector or product i / total value
of the portfolio
Si = variance of the price index for sector or product i
Sij = covariance of the price indices for sectors and
products i and j
n = number of sectors or products
Analysis of the matrix of variances and covariances
shows that risk declines when covariances are negative,
as fluctuations in product prices offset one another, i.e.,
there are negative coefficients of correlation that reduce
portfolio risk.
In the case of Bolivia, the total risk for the whole
commodity export basket is positive (40.67), and the
same is true at the sectoral level (38.8), in relation to
an index of 100 (table 8). This indicator suggests that
while the structure of commodity export sectors is
diversified, this has not resulted in risk diversification.
To determine the degree to which inclusion of a
new sector increases or reduces risk, the results of
including new products from the soya complex in an
existing basket like metals are shown (table 9). It can
be seen that the original risk of 30.11 in the mining
sector rises to a total risk of 35.49 when this complex
is included.
When we come to specific product prices, however,
the covariance analysis reveals compensation effects,
as the following results show:
— Altogether, there are 31 pairs of commodities with
negative covariances out of a total of 78 pairs, i.e.,
the intrasectoral and intersectoral compensation
rate is 40%.
— Intrasectoral compensation is greatest in mining
with three product pairs out of six, these being zinc
and gold (-0.66), zinc and silver (-0.58) and gold
and silver (-0.30). This means that, contrary to
expectations, price fluctuations within the precious
metals sector offset one another. The compensation
rate in the agricultural sector is 30% (seven out of
22 product pairs), it being noteworthy that there is
no compensation within the soya complex. There
is compensation between wood and this complex,
between coffee and sugar (-0.11) and between
wood and coffee (-0.75).
— There is a significant level of intersectoral
compensation, 21 out of a total of 31 product pairs
having negative covariances. Setting the mining
TABLE 8
Bolivia: Sectoral matrix of variances
and covariances




Agricultural sector 3.24 16.26
Fuels 2.12 3.50 7.78
Weighted summation of variances 29.95
Weighted summation of covariances 8.87
Overall risk 38.82
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Central
Bank of Bolivia.
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sector against the agricultural sector, the main
features are the negative covariances between silver
and agricultural commodities (except wood) and
the compensation between the zinc price and the
prices of woods, cotton and sugar. Taking the
agricultural and mining sectors, it is found in
particular that soya offsets silver and tin, sugar
offsets mining products (except gold) and wood
offsets zinc and gold.
— Comparing the fuels and mining sectors shows
silver offsetting gas and petroleum and gold
offsetting petroleum. Taking the fuel and
agricultural sectors, petroleum is found to present
negative covariances with everything except cotton.
The price of gas, which will be the main export
product, moves in a different direction to those of
silver, woods and coffee; note that there is no
compensation between the gas price and the soya
complex. However, the gas price was influenced
by the lower rates set in the contract with Argentina,
so in future it could behave much like the petroleum
price, which moves against the prices of most other
products.
In summary, there is no reduction of risk at the
sectoral level because prices move in the same direction.
At the product level, however, price movements both
within sectors and among them produce large
compensation effects. These effects are most common
among export products in the mining sector, particularly
precious metals. As regards intersectoral movements,
silver strongly offsets fuels and most agricultural
products, and soya strongly offsets silver, tin and
petroleum. The gas price is only offset by a very few
products.
TABLE 9
Bolivia: Metals and soya complex portfolio
A. Starting scenario: metals portfolio
Zinc Gold Tin Silver
Zinc 20.55
Gold -3.12 7.32
Tin 1.97 0.18 2.33
Silver -2.73 -1.42 0.22 4.80
Weighted summation of variances 35.00
Weighted summation of covariances -4.89
Overall risk 30.11
B. Final scenario: metals portfolio plus soya complex
Zinc Gold Tin Silver Soya Meal Oil
Zinc 9.35
Gold -1.42 3.33
Tin 0.90 0.08 1.06
Silver -1.24 -0.64 0.10 2.18
Soya 0.77 0.83 -0.24 -0.51 1.85
Meal 1.95 2.49 0.12 -1.02 2.89 7.94
Oil 0.21 1.06 0.09 -1.14 0.68 0.63 3.18
Weighted summation of variances 28.90
Weighted summation of covariances 6.59
Overall risk 35.49





The recent empirical and theoretical literature has not
attached the same importance to commodity price
shocks as to financial crises, although it is once again
giving some weight to the subject of persistence in price
shocks. Empirical evidence has been found to show that
they are persistent, and that the downward phase of price
movements lasts longer than the upward phase. In other
words, there is information to support the idea that
commodity prices are in long-term decline. However,
other evidence runs counter to the perception that
commodity prices are falling across the board.
The poor performance of Bolivia’s exports stands
in contrast to the dynamism of world exports, most of
which are manufactures. The reason for this is that
Bolivia is highly dependent on commodity exports
(84% of total exports in 1999), whose prices declined
significantly in the 1990s, resulting in a sharp
deterioration in the terms of trade. Nonetheless, the
composition of Bolivian exports is not dominated by
just a few products, as is the case in most developing
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countries, and nor are they dependent on any particular
sector. This should have reduced the country’s external
vulnerability. The results of this study show, however,
that risk has not fallen, cycles have not been evened
out, and the volatility of export prices has not decreased.
Bolivian export commodity prices display cyclical
behaviour against a declining trend, with upward
movements having about the same duration as
downward movements. In the declining phase following
the Asian crisis, price falls slightly exceeded the price
rises seen in the upward phase. If the trend is smoothed,
the downward phase lasted much longer than the
recovery phase. The short-term price shock in Bolivia
really made itself felt in May 1998 when prices fell
below trend, although the decline had begun in June
1997.
Permanent shocks help explain the variance of
monthly prices. There is a permanent component in
Bolivia’s price shocks, albeit a smaller one than in
developing countries generally. At the sectoral level,
this component is largest (but not very persistent) for
metals. Consequently, the recent price fall has not
tended to correct itself quickly. The relative size of
permanent shocks is greatest for metal prices, 69% of
whose monthly variance is due to the permanent
component, while in the agricultural and fuel sectors
the figure is about 25%, and in the overall price indices,
including and excluding fuels, it is about 30%. For metal
prices, the permanent component displays a low degree
of persistence.
In the case of Bolivia, by contrast with other
developing countries, there was found to be a high
degree of concordance at the sectoral level, indicating
that commodity export diversification has not served
to soften the effects of the price cycle, and thus has not
been countercyclical in its effects. At the product level,
however, it transpires that a third of all exports are of
commodities with countercyclical prices, examples
being silver and tin (13.1% of all exports in 1996)
against soya beans and soya meal (14.3%), and silver
against gas (8%).
The overall index is not highly volatile when
compared with the level of volatility identified for
developing countries in general by the other studies
referred to. Metal prices are the least volatile and fuel
prices the most volatile. Agricultural prices in general
are of only intermediate volatility, but specific products
such as soya meal, soya oil, coffee, sugar and cotton
are among the most volatile in the Bolivian export
basket. The international crisis increased price volatility
in 1997 and again in 1999.
When the portfolio risk method is applied to
Bolivia’s export basket (it was not used in the similar
studies on developing countries mentioned in the
theoretical discussion), it transpires that expanding the
export portfolio by introducing a new commodity
export sector, the soya complex, has not reduced overall
risk. If the individual products in the export basket are
taken, however, a significant percentage of
compensation is found (40%) within and between
sectors. Within sectors, the largest effects of this kind
are in the mining sector and among precious metals. In
the agricultural sector, compensation runs at 30% and
is not found within the soya complex.
There is a significant level of compensation
between the mining and agricultural sectors.
Particularly striking are the negative covariances
between silver and agricultural commodities, except
wood, and the compensation between the soya price
and the prices of silver and tin. Taking the fuel and
mining sectors, silver offsets gas and petroleum and
gold offsets petroleum. Between the fuel and
agricultural sectors, petroleum displays negative
covariances with all agricultural products except cotton,
but gas displays few compensation effects.
The prospects for the export sector centre on silver
mining and gas exports; the two products are found to
behave in a complementary way, which lessens the
impact of adverse shocks. Firstly, the volatility of the
silver price is low while that of the gas price is very
high. Secondly, silver and gas prices move in different
directions, so that the two products can help to reduce
risk and, being countercyclical, to soften the phases of
the cycle.
2. Policy recommendations
It is not advisable for the country to persist with a strategy
based principally on exporting a diversifying range of
commodities. In the 1990s, this did nothing to reduce
risk, smooth cycles, reduce export price volatility or
increase real export revenues.
The empirical evidence has shown that Bolivia needs
to supplement its commodity export diversification
strategy with an explicit manufacturing export
development strategy which, unlike the neutral policy
applied hitherto, should include selective production and
export promotion policies with a view to reducing
external vulnerability in the face of adverse commodity
price shocks. This means that structural measures are
needed to reduce the country’s high degree of external
vulnerability.
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Exchange-rate policy should include the behaviour
of commodity prices, and most importantly the terms
of trade, among the range of indicators it tracks. It
should be used to help offset adverse shocks, as these
have negative implications for export levels and
economic activity.
Permanent shocks, when they occur, lessen the
effects of the commodity price stabilization policies
recommended by IMF. But the existence of a large
transitory component makes it advisable for Bolivia to
apply transitory or short-term measures, such as the
provision of funds under IMF financial assistance
programmes when export revenues fall, and the
application of stabilization funds to some strategic
commodity such as soya, following the example of
Chile with copper.
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